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REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS: EMPLOYERS AS 
MONITORS? 
 
DANA M. MUIR* 
 
*** 
 
This article presents a discussion of the use of revenue sharing by mutual 
funds and 401(k) plan service providers.  The author engages in a 
historical exploration of how revenue sharing has been used in 401(k) 
plans and highlights how regulators have taken an increased interest in 
ensuring disclosure of fund monies diverted for revenue sharing purposes.  
In addition, the article discusses how the current federal regulatory 
framework for employee benefits has not adapted to the increased use of 
401(k) plans.  The author challenges how ERISA places the burden of 
monitoring compensation to service providers on the employers who make 
the 401(k) plan available to their employees and instead, presents several 
alternative frameworks that would decrease employer responsibility and 
liability for investment selection. 
 
*** 
 
Employees have maligned the use of revenue sharing1 in 401(k) 
plans2 as a burden on investment returns and a hidden source of wealth for 
plan service providers.3  A few commentators have been shrill in their 
                                                                                                                                      
*Arthur F. Thurnau Professor of Business Law, Stephen M. Ross School of 
Business at the University of Michigan.  dmuir@umich.edu. 734.763.3091. I 
appreciate the research support provided by Michigan Ross.  Thank you to the 
organizers of the 2013 symposium at the University of Connecticut School of Law, 
The Challenge of Retirement in a Defined Contribution World, which helped me 
sharpen my thinking on a variety of issues, including those I discuss in this Article.  
I have served as an expert witness in a 401(k) case that involved revenue sharing.   
1 For a discussion of the nuances of the definition of revenue sharing, see infra 
text accompanying notes 23–27. 
2 401(k) plans are employer-sponsored benefit plans that permit employees to 
contribute a portion of their future earnings to the plan. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 
6–15 (Jeffrey Lewis et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2012).  
3 See, e.g., Healthcare Strategies, Inc. v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., No. 
3:11-CV-282, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184544, at *3–4 (D. Conn. Sept. 27, 2012) 
(ruling on various motions in a case where plaintiffs alleged that revenue sharing in 
a 401(k) plan violated federal law); see also Matthew D. Hutcheson, Uncovering 
and Understanding Hidden Fees in Qualified Retirement Plans, 15 ELDER L.J. 323, 
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criticism of revenue sharing.4 Service providers have responded that 
traditionally they did not have any obligation to report or limit the amount 
of revenue sharing they received and that revenue sharing has supported 
growth and innovation in 401(k) plans.5  Policy groups have concluded that 
the use of revenue sharing in 401(k) plans is widespread and not 
necessarily pernicious.6  Given the varying perspectives of the parties, none 
of that is surprising or particularly troubling. 
What is troubling, however, is the extent to which responsibility 
for alleged misuse of or failure to monitor revenue sharing in 401(k) plans 
is laid at the feet of employers who voluntarily sponsor those plans.  In my 
view, this assignment of responsibility for decision making and oversight is 
just one example of a larger issue – an antiquated regulatory model of 
employer responsibility in 401(k) plans.7  To maximize the opportunity of 
employees to build lifelong financial security through the United States 
paradigm of voluntary plan sponsorship, it is imperative that the regulatory 
system properly allocate responsibility and liability.  My goal in this 
Article is modest; I will evaluate the way in which the federal law that 
                                                                                                                                      
328 (2007) (“‘Revenue sharing’ is a euphemism for kickbacks from one financial 
services firm to another and is a common economic driver of conflicts of 
interest.”). 
4 See Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 328 (“‘Revenue sharing’ is a euphemism for 
kickbacks from one financial service firm to another . . . .”); Cris de la Torre & 
Rutilio Martinez, Mutual Fund Revenue Sharing: A Case of Pay to Play, 4 J. PERS. 
FIN. 47, 48 (2005) (“‘[R]evenue sharing’ . . . looks very much like a ‘pay to play’ 
practice associated with the supermarkets and shelf space . . .”). 
5 See, e.g., Leimkuehler v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 713 F.3d 905, 914 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (finding that plan administrator was not a fiduciary with respect to 
revenue sharing it received). 
6 ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON 
FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND REVENUE SHARING PRACTICES (2007), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/AC-1107b.html (“[R]evenue-
sharing in a broad sense allows the market ‘to develop efficiencies and innovations 
that have enhanced the quality of services of products available to [defined 
contribution] and 401(k) plans.’”).   
7 See Dana M. Muir, Choice Architecture and the Locus of Fiduciary 
Obligation in Defined Contribution Plans, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2013) (criticizing 
assignment of responsibility to employers for selection and oversight of plan 
investment options). 
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regulates benefit plans, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA),8 applies to the use of revenue sharing in 401(k) plans.   
I begin this Article with a discussion of the history of revenue 
sharing in 401(k) plans and how that history relates to the use of revenue 
sharing outside plans.  The discussion shows that revenue sharing has 
become an integral part of 401(k) plan history.  In Part II, I assess the 
limited information that has been available on the prevalence of revenue 
sharing in 401(k) plans.  Until the early-to-mid 2000s, little attention 
appears to have been paid to revenue sharing except by those who pay and 
receive it.  That Part also considers innovations in 401(k) plans, which may 
have been supported by the use of revenue sharing.   
In Part III, I briefly explain the extent to which federal employee 
benefits regulation applies to the use of revenue sharing in 401(k) plans.  In 
contrast to federal disclosure requirements, the governing fiduciary 
framework has not adapted to the increased importance and complexity of 
401(k) plans.  ERISA’s fiduciary standards do not impose any 
responsibility or liability regarding revenue sharing on the mutual funds 
that pay it or the plan service providers that receive it.  Instead, employers 
bear the burden of assessing the practice.  The potential liability of 
employers regarding revenue sharing is comprised of two primary 
responsibilities: employers must (1) ensure that compensation to plan 
service providers is reasonable and (2) act loyally and prudently when 
choosing and monitoring the investments that employees may make 
through the 401(k) plan.  In Part IV, I raise the question of whether 
employers are the best-positioned actors among the constellation of plan-
related actors to monitor revenue sharing.  I end by briefly outlining 
alternative regulatory structures that would reallocate responsibility away 
from employers. 
 
I. HISTORY OF REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS 
 
The development and expansion of 401(k) plans supported growth 
in the mutual fund industry and has been linked from the relatively early 
days of those plans with the use of revenue sharing.  The addition of 
                                                                                                                                      
8 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93–406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 
U.S.C.). 
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subsection (k)9 to Section 40110 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in 
1978 first permitted what have come to be known as 401(k) plans.  At that 
time, defined benefit (DB) plans, which typically provide guaranteed 
lifetime incomes, were the paradigmatic type of retirement plan in the 
United States.11 The original purpose of the 1978 amendment was to clarify 
that employees could contribute to benefit plans through salary reductions, 
not to remake the U.S. system of private sector retirement plans.12 
 The number of 401(k) plans grew after the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) issued explanatory regulations in 1981.13 As of 1996, 401(k) 
plan accounts held $1 trillion in assets.  By the end of 2005, 401(k) plans 
had surpassed DB plans in terms of numbers of participants (employees 
and their beneficiaries who are entitled to plan benefits) and assets.  401(k) 
plans continue to be the most prevalent type of retirement plan sponsored 
by private sector employers.  401(k) plan assets grew from $2.4 trillion in 
2005 to almost $3.8 trillion as of March 31, 2013.14 
According to one report, in the early days of 401(k) plans, some 
employers were reluctant to handle plan administration services such as:  
(a) communications,; (b) acting as the liaison between participants, mutual 
                                                                                                                                      
9 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, §135(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2785 
(Nov. 6, 1978).  
10 I.R.C. § 401(k) (2006). 
11 Other types of retirement plans were so insignificant at that time that they 
were not even included in the National Compensation Survey. See EMP. BENEFIT 
RESEARCH INST., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS Table 10.1(a) (2005), 
available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/databook/DB.Chapter% 
2010.pdf.  
12 See EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., HISTORY OF 401(K) PLANS: AN UPDATE 
(2005), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0205fact.a.pdf. 
13 Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment Advice and Investment 
Education:  Is No Advice Really the Best Advice?, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
1, 6 (2002).  
14 SARAH HOLDEN ET AL., 401(K) PLANS: A 25-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 3 
(2006), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/per12-02.pdf; SARAH HOLDEN & 
DANIEL SCHRASS, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN PARTICIPANTS’ ACTIVITIES, 
FIRST QUARTER 2013 2 (July 2013), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_13_rec_survey_q1.pdf. Comparatively, in 2005, DB 
plans held $1.9 trillion in assets and $2.7 trillion as of March 31, 2013. Holden et 
al., supra; Robert Steyer, ICI: Retirement Assets Total $20.8 Trillion in First 
Quarter 2013, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, June 26, 2013, 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20130626/ONLINE/130629908/ici-us-retirement-
assets-hit-record-208-trillion. 
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funds; and (c) trading.  While there is no data on why employers decided 
not to handle these functions themselves, the administration of investment 
accounts is not among the core competencies of most employers.  It makes 
sense that third parties could perform the functions more efficiently than if 
each employer had to develop and maintain its own staff and capabilities.  
Consulting firms apparently spotted the business opportunity and began to 
perform the necessary administrative plan functions.  Perhaps to compete 
on the direct costs that were most visible to employers choosing among 
service providers, in the early 1990s, those service providers began to seek 
payments – revenue sharing -- from the mutual funds that were offered as 
investments in 401(k) plans.15  
In theory, instead of making payments to consulting firms, the 
mutual funds themselves could have developed the expertise to provide 
administrative services to 401(k) plans.  Eventually, as the industry and 
401(k) plans grew, large fund families developed the capabilities needed to 
offer plan administrative services.16 During the 1990s, however, it appears 
that at least some mutual funds concentrated on their investment expertise 
and chose not to deal directly with investors or employers that sponsored 
401(k) plans.  For sales to investors who were not 401(k) plan participants, 
mutual funds relied on brokers and personal investment advisers to handle 
the interactions with investors, including communications, customer 
service, and trading.  The mutual funds compensated the brokers and 
investment advisers for those services by paying them a portion of the 
funds’ revenue (an early form of revenue sharing).17 The revenue sharing to 
the service providers that fulfilled parallel functions in 401(k) plans 
mirrored the practice used by the funds outside 401(k) plans. 
Modern mutual funds pre-date 1940, when the Investment 
Company Act of 194018 was enacted to regulate the industry.  In 1981, 
                                                                                                                                      
15 McHenry Consulting Group, Revenue Sharing in the 401(k) Marketplace: 
Whose Money Is It?, 3 (2001), available at 
http://www.plansponsor.com/pdfs/ 
White%20Papers/McHenry_Rev_Share_Report.pdf.   
16 See, e.g., Tussey v. ABB, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 45240, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) (discussing the various plan-related 
roles played by affiliates of Fidelity Investments). 
17 John Howat & Linda Reid, Compensation Practices for Retail Sale of 
Mutual Funds: The Need for Transparency and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 685, 687-94 (2007). 
18 Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-64 (2006)).  
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when the IRS issued the first 401(k) regulations, U.S. mutual funds held 
assets of just over $241 billion.19 As 401(k) plans grew in assets and 
popularity, so did mutual funds.  The fate of the two is linked because a 
significant percentage of the assets invested in mutual fund assets are 
typically held in retirement plan accounts.  By the end of 2005, mutual 
funds held almost $8.1 trillion in assets, and that number grew to more than 
$13 trillion at the end of 2012.20  At that time, $2.7 trillion of those assets 
were held in defined contribution plans.21 
In 1980, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
promulgated Rule 12b-1,22 which formalized the ability of mutual funds to 
use fund assets to pay for marketing and distribution costs.  Here, a brief 
detour into terminology is warranted.  The securities industry and its 
commentators typically break payments made from mutual funds into more 
categories than is typical of the employee benefits industry and its 
commentators.  For example, in an article focused on securities law, 
Professors Howat and Reid discussed a variety of “enhanced compensation 
arrangements”23 used by mutual funds.  They explained revenue sharing as 
“occur[ring] when a fund manager agrees to pay a brokerage firm cash 
compensation not otherwise disclosed in the prospectus fee table to 
promote the mutual fund to the broker’s clients.”24 They separately define 
12b–1 fees, which are paid by mutual funds out of fund assets rather than 
by the fund manager, as a separate category of fees.25 As for other 
categories of enhanced compensation practices they discuss “directed 
brokerage,” “soft dollar practices,” and “differential cash compensation.”26 
Often, the employee benefits community includes any payments made from 
mutual funds or their managers in its use of the term revenue sharing.27 In 
                                                                                                                                      
19 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2013 Investment Company Fact Book 
142 (2013), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 132. The report does not break out 401(k) account holdings from the 
more inclusive category of defined contribution accounts. Id. 
22 Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 11,414, 45 Fed. Reg. 73,898 (Nov. 7, 1980). 
23 Howat & Reid, supra note 17, at 687. 
24 Id. at 689–90. 
25 See id. at 694 (stating that the expense ratio of a fund typically includes an 
advisory fee, administrative fee and 12b-1 fees). 
26 Id. at 688–91. 
27 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-12-325, 
401(K) PLANS:  INCREASED EDUCATIONAL OUTREACH AND BROADER OVERSIGHT 
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employee benefits parlance, revenue sharing includes both its narrow 
securities law definition and other amounts paid by mutual funds, such as 
12b-1 fees.  Unless otherwise specifically noted, in this Article, I use the 
term “revenue sharing” in this broad sense, as defined by the employee 
benefits community.  
The now well-known brokerage company, Charles Schwab 
Corporation (Schwab), is credited with using the concept of revenue 
sharing to establish a 401(k) plan paradigm that remains in widespread use 
today.  In 1992, it first offered what it described as an “innovative service,” 
which allowed investors to choose among multiple mutual funds from a 
variety of fund families rather than being limited to a single fund family 
and to do so without paying any direct fees to Schwab for administering 
their accounts.28 As with other mutual fund practices, such as revenue 
sharing where mutual funds used parallel approaches for individual 
investors and 401(k) plans,29 Schwab offered its new innovation to 401(k) 
plan sponsors as well as to individual investors.  In the 401(k) offering, 
Schwab provided record keeping services, including a single statement for 
participants showing their investments in all funds.  Schwab originally 
referred to this as a “no transaction fee” (NTF) program.  Reportedly, 
“Schwab eliminated transactions costs, supporting the platform on revenue 
generated by fund distribution commissions and servicing fees.”30 In simple 
terms, Schwab’s NTF model relied on revenue sharing to pay for all of the 
services that Schwab provided to 401(k) plans or to individual investors.  
As discussed below, the use of revenue sharing to offset plan costs 
continues to be in widespread use to this day.   
 
                                                                                                                                      
MAY HELP REDUCE PLAN FEES 10 (2012), available at http://www.gao. 
gov/assets/600/590359.pdf (defining revenue sharing “in the 401(k) plan industry, 
[as] generally referr[ing] to indirect payments made from one service provider, 
such as the investment fund provider, to another service provider in connection 
with services provided to the plan, rather than payments made directly by the plan 
sponsor for plan services.”). 
28 Charles Schwab, Schwab’s Mutual Fund OneSource® at 20:  How a Single 
Idea Transformed the Way America Invests at 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.aboutschwab.com/images/press/071612MFOSWhitePaper.pdf. 
29 See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
30 McHenry Consulting Group, supra note 15, at 3. 
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II. REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS – SCOPE AND 
 EFFECT 
 
Little reliable historical data exists on the growth and amount of 
revenue sharing that has been paid within 401(k) plans.  However, as the 
first subsection below discusses, the available evidence indicates that the 
dollar volume of revenue sharing is substantial and the practice is widely 
used.  To provide some context for the way revenue sharing may redound 
to the benefit of 401(k) plan participants, the following subsection 
discusses the complexity of plan administration and services. 
 
A. SCOPE OF REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS 
 
Plans were not required to report revenue sharing until 2009, when 
the Department of Labor (DOL) began requiring reporting of those 
payments as part of large plans’ annual reporting.31 To this day, securities 
law requires reporting of 12b-1 fees, but not those fees paid by fund 
managers that are known as revenue sharing in the securities law 
community.32 As one data point in 2006, 12b-1 fees paid by all mutual 
funds, not just those held in 401(k) accounts and excluding revenue sharing 
as used in the securities context, totaled $11.8 billion.33  
It appears that plan fees and employer responsibilities for 
understanding those fees started to become of interest to regulators in the 
late 1990s.  The DOL commissioned a study of 401(k) fees which 
culminated in a report entitled “Study of 401(k) Plan Fees and Expenses.”34 
That report explicitly discussed 12b-1 and other types of fees35 but did not 
use the term “revenue sharing.”  However, it recognizes the general 
concept that “[i]n the case of mutual fund expense ratios or where the 
investment management fees are otherwise incorporated in net asset 
                                                                                                                                      
31 See Michele A. Rivas, Fee Disclosures by Service Providers to Benefit 
Plans:  How to Protect Your Clients, 34 MI. TAX L. 11, 12-13 (2008). Plans do not 
always need to report revenue sharing separately from other types of compensation 
paid to plan service providers. Id. at 13. 
32 See Howat & Reid, supra note 17, at 689–96. 
33 John P. Freeman, The Mutual Fund Distribution Expense Mess, 32 IOWA J. 
CORP. L. 739, 744 (2007). 
34 PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, INC., STUDY 
OF 401(K) PLAN FEES AND EXPENSES (1998), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/401kRept.pdf. 
35 See id. at 3.3.5. 
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valuation computations, participants pay all of the fees.”36 In addition to the 
study, in 1997, the DOL held hearings on the transparency of fees in 401(k) 
plans.  The extent to which employers and participants would benefit from 
increased transparency was somewhat controversial.37  
In spite of the amount of revenue sharing changing hands and its 
role in 401(k) plan innovation, the first report I have found that explicitly 
refers to revenue sharing as such in the context of 401(k) plans was issued 
by the McHenry Consulting Group in 2001.38 That report, titled “Revenue-
Sharing in the 401(k) Marketplace,” explained that U.S. securities laws 
permit mutual fund companies to share their revenues with service 
providers to 401(k) plans.  According to the report, “Almost every 
investment and administration service provider engages in this activity to 
some degree.  It is virtually impossible to compete in the 401(k) 
marketplace without subsidies to help offset service costs, as provided by 
asset-based revenues.”39 It also provides some general information about 
the costs of plan services and the kinds of services that affect costs.40  
A policy advisory group to the DOL, known as the ERISA 
Advisory Council,41 of which I was a member at the time, studied revenue 
sharing in 2004.  In my experience, each year, the ERISA Advisory 
Council members choose approximately three issues to consider.  Working 
groups are constituted to study those issues.  ERISA Advisory Council 
members then volunteer to serve on any or all of the working groups, 
according to interest and expertise.   
The 2004 working group on plan fees and reporting on Form 5500 
(Fees and Reporting Working Group) heard testimony over multiple days 
from a number of industry participants about plan fees, and some of those 
                                                                                                                                      
36 Id. at 5.3.2. 
37 See id. at 5.3.3 (reporting that the disclosure to sponsors and participants of 
fees and expenses imposed on 401(k) plans is often not complete and that this lack 
of information may affect the costs to the plans).   
38 McHenry Consulting Group, supra note 15. 
39 Id. at 4. 
40 Id. at 5–6. 
41 ERISA Advisory Councils are comprised of fifteen member groups of 
citizens appointed for staggered three-year terms by the Secretary of Labor. Pub. L. 
93-406, tit. I, § 512, 88 Stat. 895 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1142 (2006)). I 
was a member of the ERISA Advisory Council from 2002–2004, and was a 
member of both the working group that studied plan fees and reporting and the one 
that studied fee and related disclosures to participants. 
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witnesses discussed revenue sharing.42 As is typical, the working group’s 
final report includes summaries of the testimony of each witness and the 
group’s overall findings based on the testimony.  The report confirms that 
the data available to the employee benefit plans community on revenue 
sharing were limited.  A number of the witnesses discussed the lack of 
transparency of plan fees and revenue-sharing arrangements.43 None of the 
witnesses that I remember advanced a legal theory under which service 
providers had any obligation to disclose revenue sharing unless asked by an 
employer.  Nor were revenue-sharing disclosures required as part of plans’ 
annual reporting to the DOL.  
 In spite of the lack of specific data, the working group’s 
conclusions reflect the testimony that 401(k) plan service providers often 
relied on revenue sharing to compensate them in full or part for the services 
they provided to the plan.44  In its findings, the Fees and Reporting 
Working Group wrote:  “[t]he testimony established that explicit charges in 
many plans have been substantially reduced or nearly completely 
eliminated and the majority of costs associated with administering many 
retirement plans are now embedded in the form of asset-based fees and 
borne by the plan participants.”45  The report recommended that the DOL 
study regarding the reporting of plan fees, including the use of revenue 
sharing, should be required.46 
At least two other direct or indirect references to revenue sharing 
and 401(k) plans date to 2004.  A second working group of the 2004 
ERISA Advisory Council focused on the somewhat different issue of how 
fee disclosures related to participant investment elections.47 That group’s 
final report did not directly discuss revenue sharing, except to the extent 
that specific witnesses used the term and it became part of the summaries 
                                                                                                                                      
42 See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE & PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, 
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON PLAN FEES AND REPORTING ON FORM 5500 
(2004), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa 
/publications/AC_111804_report.html. 
43 See, e.g., id. at 10. 
44 Id. at 2. 
45 Id. at 5.  
46 Id. at 3.  
47 See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE & PENSION BENEFITS PLANS, 
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FEE AND RELATED DISCLOSURES TO 
PARTICIPANTS (2004), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/AC_ 
111704_report.html. 
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of the individual testimony.48 In addition, the New York Times quoted an 
employee of a prominent benefits consulting firm as stating that “90% of 
401(k) plans engage in revenue sharing.”49   
Interest in and discussion about the prevalence of revenue sharing 
in 401(k) plans has continued.  In 2007, another working group of the 
ERISA Advisory Council studied fiduciary responsibilities and revenue-
sharing practices.  In introducing its findings on revenue sharing, the report 
states, “[t]he Working Group recognized that there was a considerable 
amount of consensus with respect to the concept of revenue sharing, how it 
can benefit plan sponsors and their participants.”50  The first of its four 
consensus thoughts was that “[r]evenue sharing is an acceptable practice.”51 
The prevalence of revenue sharing is implicit in those statements and 
throughout the report.  The report also reflects a belief that revenue sharing 
pays for plan services that would have to be paid for in some other way in 
the absence of revenue sharing. “[T]he Working Group recognized that 
revenue sharing was a common and considerable practice used to offset 
plan expenses with respect to [defined contribution] plans.”52  
Today, revenue sharing continues to be widely used in 401(k) plans 
and to attract the attention of commentators and policy makers.  In a 2011 
report on fees in the 401(k) plan marketplace, Deloitte reported survey 
results showing that 55 percent of the responding plan sponsors reported 
that “all of the record-keeping and administrative fees are paid through 
investment revenue.”53 In 2012, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) released the results of its study of 401(k) plan fees, which is 
discussed in more detail below.54 The DOL has also imposed a variety of 
mandatory reporting requirements regarding plan fees and the use of 
revenue sharing.55  
                                                                                                                                      
48 Id. at 13, 18.  
49 Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1961, 2004 n.269 (2010) (quoting Lynn O’Shaughnessy, A 401(k) 
Picks a Mutual Fund.  Who Gets a Perk?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, at BU5). 
50 ERISA Advisory Council, supra note 6, at 3. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1-2. 
53 DELOITTE ET AL., ANNUAL 401(K) BENCHMARKING SURVEY 24 (2011), 
available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/ 
Documents/us_consulting_Deloitte%20401k%20Survey_2011%20edition_120820
11.pdf. 
54 GAO, supra note 27; see also infra text accompanying notes 114-17.  
55 See infra text accompanying notes Part III.A. 
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B. EFFECT OF REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS 
 
Since Schwab created the NTF model in 1992, 401(k) plans have 
added services to participants, increased the average number of investment 
options they offer participants, and complied with increasing regulatory 
obligations.  Plans now face far more extensive regulatory requirements 
than at the time 401(k) plans began.56  
The costs of these elaborate and extensive services may be shared 
between employers and employees, but employees usually pay the largest 
share.  One survey shows that 83 percent of all fees associated with 401(k) 
plans are paid by plan participants.  Most of those payments are made 
through revenue sharing.  The survey also notes that some of the revenue 
sharing may pay for plan administration, including recordkeeping.57  
The main concern that seems to be expressed about the effect of 
revenue sharing on 401(k) plan participants is the lack of transparency 
associated with revenue sharing.  According to one commentator, Matthew 
Hutcheson,58 “[r]evenue sharing is the ‘big secret’ of the retirement 
                                                                                                                                      
56 See, e.g., DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL REGULATION RELATING TO SERVICE 
PROVIDER DISCLOSURES UNDER SECTION 408 (B)(2): FACT SHEET (2012), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fs408b2finalreg.html (explaining 
the obligation of service providers to disclose compensation to plan fiduciaries, 
which implies the obligation of plan fiduciaries to evaluate those disclosures); 
DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL RULE TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY OF FEES AND 
EXPENSES TO WORKERS IN 401(K)-TYPE RETIREMENT PLANS: FACT SHEET (2012), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsparticipantfeerule.html 
(explaining final regulations requiring plans to disclose plan fees to participants); 
DEP’T OF LABOR, REGULATION RELATING TO QUALIFIED DEFAULT INVESTMENT 
ALTERNATIVES IN PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT PLANS (2008), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsQDIA.html (explaining the 
effect of and requirements for a 401(k) plan offering a "qualified default 
investment alternative."). 
57 DELOITTE, INSIDE THE STRUCTURE OF DEFINED CONTRIBUTION/401(K) PLAN 
FEES:  A STUDY ASSESSING THE MECHANICS OF THE ‘ALL-IN’ FEE 5 (2011), 
available at https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/ 
Documents /us_consulting_StructureofDefineContribution_112411.pdf. 
58 In 2013, Mr. Hutcheson was sentenced to prison after being convicted of 
wire fraud in connection with his service as a retirement plan fiduciary. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Eagle Man Sentenced to Over 17 Years in Prison for Theft from 
Retirement Plans (July 31, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao/id/news/2013/jul/ 
hutcheson07312013.html. 
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industry.”59 Some witnesses to the ERISA Advisory Council’s 2004 Fees 
and Reporting Working Group expressed the view that neither participants 
nor plan sponsors had a good understanding of revenue sharing.60 Mr. 
Hutcheson feared that revenue sharing “impair[s] the retirement income 
security of participants,”61 and could result in fiduciary liability for plan 
sponsors who fail to consider these costs when making decisions regarding 
plan service providers.62 
However, to the extent that sponsors with that plan face fiduciary 
liability because of the lack of transparency in revenue sharing, one 
response – and the one I advocate later in this Article – is that the system 
has it wrong when it allocates fiduciary responsibility for revenue sharing-
related decision making to plan sponsors.63  If, as the 2007 ERISA Working 
Group found, revenue sharing has encouraged the development of 
important services to participants and enhanced the popularity of 401(k) 
plans, then it would seem to have accomplished the opposite of impairing 
retirement security.   
It is important to recognize that the array of functions provided by 
401(k) plan service providers is very broad.  Those functions include 
account statements, educational programs and materials, investment 
transactions, call centers, web sites, etc., that provide information and 
receive transaction orders, process plan loans, distributions, roll-overs, 
contributions, and court orders to divide 401(k) plan accounts upon a 
participant’s divorce, etc.  Some of these services, such as account 
statements, are required by law.64 Others, such as call centers and websites, 
are not required but provide participants with enhanced access to 
information about their accounts and efficient methods of implementing 
investment decisions.  Service providers may perform a variety of other 
services, such as preparing annual reports the plan must file with the DOL65 
                                                                                                                                      
59 Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 328.  
60 ERISA Advisory Council, supra note 42, at 9-10, 12.  
61 Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 328. 
62 Id. 
63 See infra text accompanying notes 146-48. 
64 See, e.g., ERISA § 105(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006) 
(requiring plans that permit participants to choose their investments to provide a 
benefits statement at least quarterly).  
65 See, e.g., ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023 (2006) (requiring plans to file 
annual reports). Filing Form 5500 with the DOL fulfills this reporting requirement. 
See Fisch, supra note 49, at 1986 (briefly discussing Form 5500 filing obligations). 
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and holding account assets in trust66 to enable plans to comply with legal 
requirements.  Finally, 401(k) service providers may undertake functions 
such as investment recordkeeping and serving as the interface between 
participants and investment providers such as mutual funds.  One 
commentator identified fourteen different entities or people that may 
receive payments from 401(k) plan assets for services provided to those 
plans.67    
The complexity of plan recordkeeping, participant 
communications, and similar services may also be affected by the 
investment choices offered to plan participants.  The investment options 
from which participants may choose, often referred to as the investment 
menu, have increased from an average of six in 1995 to fourteen in 2005.68 
When new financial products are developed, that can raise the question of 
whether those products are suitable for 401(k) plans.69 
The services provided by 401(k) plans redound to the benefit of 
plan participants and enable them to build wealth in those plans.  Providers 
of those 401(k) plan services must be compensated in some way for their 
services.  As explained above, the norm has become to pay for some or all 
of the costs through revenue sharing.  One prominent scholar explained it 
this way: “the employees bear the costs of running the plan but pay those 
                                                                                                                                      
66 ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. §1103 (2006). 
67 Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 344-47; see also GAO, supra note 27, at 7-9 
(discussing the variety of plan service providers and how services may be 
combined, which is referred to in the industry as bundled services). 
68 Holden et al., supra note 14, at 17. It is useful to note, however, that work 
by behavioral economists indicates that it is better for retirement participants to 
have only a small number of investment options because too large a set of options 
may discourage participants from participating in the plan. Sheena S. Iyengar et al., 
How Much Choice Is Too Much?: Contributions to 401(k) Retirement Plans, in 
PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL 
FINANCE, 83-95 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004). One important 
strategy that has been successful in increasing plan participation is to automatically 
enroll participants in plans while also providing them the opportunity to actively 
opt out. See Dana M. Muir, Default Settings in Defined Contribution Plans: A 
Comparative Approach to Fiduciary Obligation and the Role of Markets, 28 
A.B.A. J.  LAB. & EMP. L. 59, 60-61 (2012) (outlining the use of defaults in 401(k) 
plans). 
69 See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-
Traded Funds: A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 69, 74 (2008) (discussing the possibility that 401(k) plan menus 
might include exchange-traded funds (ETFs)). 
2014  REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS  499 
 
costs indirectly through the fees charged to them by the participating 
mutual funds.”70   
Arguably, revenue sharing has had a positive effect on the 
popularity of 401(k) plans and on the breadth of services the plans provide 
to participants.  This was the view of the 2007 ERISA Working Group, 
which wrote: “revenue-sharing in a broad sense allows the market ‘to 
develop efficiencies and innovations that have enhanced the quality of 
services of products available to [defined contribution] and 401(k) 
plans.’”71 The report also states: “[t]he witnesses generally testified, and the 
Working Group recognizes that revenue sharing supports a wide variety of 
distribution and shareholder servicing activities, including administrative 
record keeping and sub-transfer agent services that were traditionally 
viewed as investment fund responsibilities.”72   
   
III. THE ROLE OF EMPLOYERS IN MONITORING REVENUE 
 SHARING 
 
Federal pension regulation applies a two-prong approach to 
revenue-sharing.  One component relies on disclosure and the other on 
substantive fiduciary obligation.  This Part addresses each of those in turn.  
The analysis shows that employers bear the primary fiduciary burden vis-à-
vis the use of revenue sharing in 401(k) plans.  It further reveals that 
employers’ fiduciary obligation with respect to revenue sharing is 
comprised of two main components: (i) the obligation to ensure that 
compensation to plan service providers is reasonable; and (ii) the need to 
act loyally and prudently when choosing and monitoring products for the 
plan’s investment menu.  
 
A. DISCLOSURE OF REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS 
 
 During the past five years, the DOL has overhauled the reporting 
of the compensation received by employee benefit plan service providers, 
including their receipt of revenue-sharing.  The first disclosure obligation 
became effective in 2009 when large plans73 were required to identify in 
                                                                                                                                      
70 Fisch, supra note 49, at 2004-05. 
71 ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 6. 
72 Id. 
73 Large plans typically are those with at least one hundred participants. As of 
2005, approximately 86 percent of those participating in a 401(k) plan were in a 
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the annual reports they file with the DOL all service providers who directly 
or indirectly receive more than $5,000 compensation during the plan year 
covered by the reporting.74 Although this increased the transparency of 
service provider compensation, gaps remained.  The definition of 
compensation was broad enough to include revenue sharing.75  However, in 
certain situations, revenue sharing can be included with other types of 
compensation rather than being separately reported.76  Second, nothing in 
this annual reporting requirement required service providers to disclose 
their compensation to plan sponsors.77  When plan sponsors did not have 
compensation information from the service providers, the plan sponsors 
could meet their disclosure obligation by identifying service providers and 
noting the lack of information.78 
 The next prong of the DOL’s effort to increase the transparency of 
401(k) fees became effective in 2012 when it issued final regulations 
requiring plan service providers that receive at least $1,000 annually in 
plan-related compensation to disclose their total compensation to plan 
fiduciaries.79 In turn, the plan now must disclose administrative fees and 
expenses to plan participants.80 Guidance issued by the DOL makes clear 
that both sets of disclosure requirements include revenue sharing.81   
 In addition to providing information to plan sponsors and 
participants, disclosures of plan administrative fees and expenses may be of 
                                                                                                                                      
large plan. See Debra A. Davis, How Much is Enough? Giving Fiduciaries and 
Participants Adequate Information About Plan Expenses, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
1005, 1022 (2008).  
74 Id. at 1023. 
75 See DEP’T OF LABOR, Frequently Asked Questions: The 2009 Form 5500 
Schedule C, Q14, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_scheduleC .html. 
76 See id.  
77 Davis, supra note 73, at 1023. 
78 See id. 
79 DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL REGULATION RELATING TO SERVICE PROVIDER 
DISCLOSURES UNDER SECTION 408(B)(2): FACT SHEET 2 (2012),  available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fs408b2finalreg.html. 
80 DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL RULE TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY OF THE FEES 
AND EXPENSES TO WORKERS IN 401(K)-TYPE RETIREMENT PLANS: FACT SHEET 2 
(2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsparticipantfeerule. 
html. 
81 See DEP’T OF LABOR , FEE DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE, FIELD ASSISTANCE 
BULLETIN 2012 – 02 (2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/ 
fab2012-2.html. 
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value to other interested parties.  The tax-advantaged nature of 401(k) plans 
means that a variety of government agencies, including the Internal 
Revenue Service, may have an interest in the information.  Securities 
analysts, independent researchers, and competitors of both plan sponsors 
and plan service providers may also find the information useful.  
It is too early to tell whether the benefits of increased disclosure 
outweigh its costs.  The reporting is complex82 and commentators question 
the extent to which it is understood by either employers or employees.83 As 
described below, plan service providers have an interest in making it 
difficult for employers to compare fees across plan providers.84 The GAO’s 
2012 report discusses the extent to which employers have been comparing 
fees and, even after 2009, remain confused about plan fees and the role that 
revenue sharing plays in compensating plan service providers.85 
 
B. FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY AND REVENUE SHARING IN 
401(K) PLANS 
 
In addition to the relatively recent disclosure obligations just 
discussed, ERISA’s fiduciary standards apply to revenue-sharing.  This 
subsection explains ERISA’s basic fiduciary requirements and how those 
requirements apply to the various parties involved in the use of revenue-
sharing in 401(k) plans.  It then explains the extent to which employers 
bear the primary fiduciary obligation in authorizing and monitoring the use 
of revenue-sharing in those plans. 
When functioning as an ERISA fiduciary, individuals and entities 
must act loyally86 and in accordance with a standard of care defined as that 
of a prudent person familiar with the benefit plan matters at issue.87 To 
                                                                                                                                      
82 See, e.g., Reasonable Contract or Arrangement Under Section 408(b)(2) –  
Fee Disclosure, 77 C.F.R. § 5632 (containing a preamble in excess of 18 pages 
before the regulatory impact analysis). 
83 See Mark Mensack, The Moral Hazard of Too Big to Jail, J. COMP. & 
BENEFITS 42, 45 (2013) (discussing the frustration of some plan sponsors in trying 
to evaluate the feed disclosures). 
84 See infra text accompanying notes 118-20. 
85 GAO, supra note 27, at 24-28. 
86 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006) ("solely in 
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive purpose 
of . . . providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries."). 
87 See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2006); see also 29 
C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1997) (explaining the application of the prudence standard 
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supplement these trust law-based, general fiduciary standards, ERISA 
contains what are known as prohibited transactions provisions.  One set of 
those provisions bars transactions between a plan and certain specified 
parties that have relationships with plans, including plan service providers, 
unless an exemption applies.88 
ERISA utilizes a functional definition of fiduciary, which means 
that any person or entity that engages in actions involving discretionary 
plan administration, asset or plan management, or investment advice acts as 
a fiduciary.89 This broad definition could lead a reasonable person to think 
that the mutual funds that pay revenue sharing, the service providers that 
administer plans and receive revenue sharing from account assets, and the 
employers who sponsor plans all act as ERISA fiduciaries.  ERISA has a 
way, however, of confounding the expectations of reasonable people. 
ERISA’s fiduciary definition explicitly excludes from its scope the 
mutual funds that pay revenue sharing.  Although the functional definition 
of fiduciary includes persons or entities that engage in discretionary asset 
management, the definition clarifies that investments of plan assets in 
mutual funds do not cause the mutual fund or its advisor to become an 
ERISA fiduciary.90  It appears that Congress’ rationale for the exclusion 
when it enacted ERISA, which was well before the existence of 401(k) 
plans, was that existing federal regulation of mutual funds was sufficient.91  
Plan service providers, including those that receive revenue-
sharing, typically avoid ERISA fiduciary status in one of two ways.  First, 
they may not exercise the discretion that is required by the statute for 
fiduciary status.  For example, entities that provide recordkeeping and 
similar services may successfully argue that they merely administer the 
                                                                                                                                      
to investment duties). ERISA’s other fiduciary standards require benefit plan 
fiduciaries to minimize the risk of large losses by diversifying plan investments, 
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2006), and to act in accordance 
with plan documents, ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2006). 
88 ERISA § 406(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (2006). 
89 ERISA § 3(21)(a)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(a)(ii) (2006). 
90 See ERISA § 3(21)(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(b) (2006). 
91 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor Adv. Op. 2009-04A (Dec. 4. 2009) (stating that 
“Congress concluded that it did not need to apply ERISA’s fiduciary rules to the 
operation of mutual funds in addition to the Investment Company Act’s regulatory 
scheme.”). 
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terms of the plan and that does not constitute the fiduciary exercise of 
discretion.92   
Second, some providers of investment advice to plans and 
participants may rely on an early DOL regulation that narrowly defined the 
provision of fiduciary investment advice.  Under that regulation, issued in 
1975 when DB plans were typical, an investment adviser is not a fiduciary 
when giving advice regarding benefit plan assets or an Individual 
Retirement Account (IRA) unless the adviser (1) advises on securities 
valuation or makes recommendations on the purchase or sale of securities, 
(2) on a regular basis, (3) according to a mutual agreement with the plan or 
a plan fiduciary, (4) that provides the advice will serve as the primary basis 
for decisions on investments, and (5) the advice is individualized to the 
plan’s needs.93  For example, entities that provide advice to employers on 
the selection of plan investments can avoid fiduciary status by providing 
the advice on a one time, rather than ongoing, basis.  
The DOL recognizes that this narrow definition of fiduciary 
investment advice no longer has currency in the 401(k) plan environment.  
In 2010, the agency proposed regulations that would have dramatically 
increased the scope of financial advisory activities that result in a provider 
becoming a fiduciary when giving investment advice regarding benefit plan 
or IRA assets.  The proposed regulatory definition tracked the general 
statutory definition and specifically stated that investment advice or 
recommendations given to a plan participant or beneficiary or to an 
investor regarding an IRA are a fiduciary act.94 After widespread objection 
from the financial services sector, the DOL withdrew the proposed 
regulations.95 Current indications are that the agency plans to revise and re-
propose the regulations.96 
                                                                                                                                      
92 See e.g., Hecker v. Deere, 556 F.3d 575, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
the plan’s service provider was not a fiduciary because it did not exercise 
discretion in plan administration or with respect to plan management); cf. Tussey 
v. ABB, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45240, at *100-01 
(W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012). 
93 Definition of the Term ‘Fiduciary’, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263, 65,265 (proposed 
Oct. 22, 2010). 
94Id. at 65,277. 
95 Labor Department’s EBSA to repropose rule on definition of a fiduciary, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/ 
EBSA20111382.htm. 
96 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Conflict of Interest Rule – Investment Advice, FEDERAL 
REGISTER (2013), available at http://www.federalregister.gov/regulations/1210-
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ERISA’s exclusion of mutual funds from fiduciary status and de 
facto exclusion of nearly any service provider that wants to be excluded 
leaves employers holding the fiduciary bag for 401(k) plans.  Jurisprudence 
and DOL authority make clear that ERISA’s fiduciary definition 
encompasses certain acts of employers that sponsor a benefit plan, 
including the selection and monitoring of plan investments.97 Employers 
may form a committee of employees to select and monitor plan investments 
or otherwise delegate those functions.  In such an instance the employer 
remains a fiduciary for the appointment and monitoring of its agents and 
the agents are ERISA fiduciaries for the discretionary functions delegated 
to them.98  
In September 2006, employees began alleging that fiduciary 
violations by employers resulted in inappropriately high 401(k) plan fees 
that in turn negatively affected the employees’ account balances.99 A 
complete analysis of the litigation involving plan fees is beyond the scope 
of this Article.  It is useful, though, to consider one of the more prominent 
cases in order to categorize the types of responsibility employers face with 
respect to the use of revenue sharing in their 401(k) plans. 
                                                                                                                                      
AB32/conflict-of-interest-rule-investment-advice (targeting October 2013 for 
reproposal). 
97 See, e.g., Quan v. Computer Sci. Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 880-81 (9th Cir. 
2010) (finding that employer-fiduciary’s choice of investments was entitled to 
deference); Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account 
Plans (ERISA Section 404(c) Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,924 n.27 (Oct. 16, 
1991) (“Thus . . . the plan fiduciary has a fiduciary obligation to prudently select 
such [investment options], as well as a residual fiduciary obligation to periodically 
evaluate the performance of such [investment options].”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 
2550.404c-5(b)(2) (2012) (“Nothing in this [regulation] shall relieve a fiduciary 
from his or her duties under . . . ERISA to prudently select and monitor any 
qualified default investment alternative under the plan or from any liability that 
results from a failure to satisfy these duties, including liability for any resulting 
losses.”). But see Hecker, 556 F.3d at 586 (leaving open the issue of “whether [the 
plan sponsor’s] decision to restrict the direct investment choices in its Plans . . . is 
even a decision within [the plan sponsor’s] fiduciary responsibilities.”), order 
denying rehearing en banc, 569 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2009). 
98 See Mark Casciari & Ian Morrison, Should the Securities Exchange Act be 
the Sole Federal Remedy for an ERISA Fiduciary Misrepresentation of the Value 
of Public Employer Stock?, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 637, 643 (2006). 
99 See Chris Thixton, A 401(k) Fee Lawsuit First, PENSION CONSULTANTS INC. 
(Nov. 17, 2009), http://pension-consultants.com/2009/11/fee-lawsuit/. 
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In Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 401(k) plan participants alleged, among 
other things, that their employer, ABB, Inc. (ABB), violated its fiduciary 
duties when making decisions on matters that involved revenue sharing.100 
First, ABB allegedly permitted Fidelity Trust, the 401(k) plan’s 
recordkeeper, to receive such extensive revenue sharing payments that 
Fidelity Trust’s compensation became excessive.101 The excessive 
compensation allegedly subsidized work on non-401(k) plans that Fidelity 
Trust did for ABB.  ABB failed to convince the court that it appropriately 
monitored the fees Fidelity Trust received.102 According to the court, ABB 
was primarily concerned with minimizing its own costs rather than with 
ensuring the plan participants did not overpay Fidelity Trust.103   
Second, the participants argued that ABB had violated its fiduciary 
obligations when it deleted one mutual fund offering and selected or kept 
other funds as part of the plan’s investment menu.104 The court determined 
that ABB inappropriately considered the “effect of the fund selected on 
recordkeeping fees, and what changes to the fee structure were in [ABB’s] 
best interest” when replacing one fund with another.105 ABB also decided 
to offer some share classes in the plan that charged higher fees to 
participants, and thus paid more in revenue sharing, than paid by other 
lower-fee share classes of the same funds that were available to the plan.106  
The court held the ABB fiduciaries jointly and severally liable for $34.2 
million as a result of these fiduciary breaches.107 
The Tussey decision illustrates that employers have two primary 
responsibilities when considering the use and scope of revenue sharing.  
First, the duties of loyalty and care require employers to ensure that any 
compensation paid by the plan, directly or indirectly, to its service 
providers is reasonable.  Second, employers must act loyally and prudently 
when choosing and designating the investments offered to employees.   
                                                                                                                                      
100 Tussey v. ABB, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
45240, at *100-01 (Mar. 31, 2012). 
101 See id. at *28. 
102 Id. at *29. 
103 Id. at *31.  
104 See id. at *47-48. 
105 Id. at *57. 
106 See id. at *79. 
107 Id. at *116.  The court awarded the plaintiffs an additional $1.7 million due 
to ABB’s failure to monitor the way a Fidelity entity administered float income.  
Id. 
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In sum, ERISA’s fiduciary framework, which was developed 
during an era of DB plan dominance, imposes significant responsibility on 
employers who sponsor 401(k) plans.  Among those responsibilities is an 
obligation to select both plan service providers and the investments offered 
in the plan in accordance with fiduciary standards of loyalty and prudence.  
In contrast, ERISA generally does not impose fiduciary duties on either 
plan service providers or the providers of mutual funds offered as plan 
investments.  Revenue sharing, which is frequently used to pay some or all 
of the costs of 401(k) plan administration, illustrates the challenges and 
burdens this regulatory approach poses for employers. 
 
IV. EMPLOYERS AND 401(K) FIDUCIARY DUTIES  
 
In this Part, I briefly explain the way employers’ roles have 
changed as a result of the transition from a DB pension system to one that 
primarily relies on DC plans such as 401(k) plans.  The basic alignment of 
interests that supported the choice of an employer-centric fiduciary 
framework for DB plan investments no longer exists.  Furthermore, 
employers do not inherently have the expertise to select and monitor 
financial products targeted to individual investors or the way in which the 
product providers interact with other actors in the financial and 401(k) 
systems.  Contributing to the task for employers are information 
asymmetries between employers and providers of 401(k) services and 
investment products.  The Part concludes with a brief discussion of 
alternative regulatory approaches. 
 
A. EMPLOYER INTERESTS AND EXPERTISE IN THE 401(K) PLAN 
SYSTEM 
 
The role employers play in the retirement plans that they 
voluntarily sponsor has shifted significantly since ERISA’s fiduciary 
provisions were enacted in 1974.  ERISA requires employers to fund DB 
plans they sponsor to whatever degree necessary to enable the plans to pay 
promised benefits.108  That means that employers with DB plans have a 
direct interest in plan investments and in the fees charged to the plans.  
                                                                                                                                      
108 See Dana M. Muir, Counting the Cash:  Disclosure and Cash Balance 
Plans, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 849, 869 (2004) (“[E]mployers retain the 
obligation to fully fund a DB plan should investment returns not meet expectations 
. . .”). 
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Positive investment returns reduce an employer’s funding obligation, and 
every dollar of cost the plan pays in fees is a dollar that the employer must 
contribute to the plan.  In addition, employers have full control over DB 
plan investment decision-making.  The alignment of the employer’s 
interests with the plan beneficiaries’ interests favors treating the employers 
as plan fiduciaries. 
In the 401(k) paradigm, employers’ interests are less closely 
aligned with the retirement plan policy goal of maximizing employee 
opportunity to achieve lifelong financial security.  Most 401(k) plans 
delegate to employees the decision on how to invest their account assets.109 
As a result, employers no longer control how plan assets are invested.  Nor 
do employers have any direct interest in the investment returns.  The 
investment vehicles used in 401(k) plans may be significantly different 
from those in DB plans.  401(k) investments must be suitable for the varied 
needs of participants, which depend on demographic and risk factors as 
well as plan scale.  Since the plan service provider fees are typically paid 
either directly or indirectly by the participants, employers may be largely 
indifferent to the amount of those fees or the way in which they are charged 
to participants.  
The change in the alignment of interests is not the only factor that 
favors reallocation of the fiduciary obligations in 401(k) plans.  Employers, 
especially small ones, may not have the expertise to evaluate the financial 
products offered on their 401(k) plan menu.  There is nothing in the 
business model of non-financial sector employers to lead a reasonable 
observer to believe that employers have the professional proficiency in 
financial planning necessary to decide on the appropriate set of investment 
choices to be offered to employees.  Nor are employers necessarily 
knowledgeable about the increasing complexities of financial products and 
how those products operate within the larger 401(k) system that 
encompasses a range of service providers such as broker-dealers, financial 
planners, and record keepers.   
A variety of factors contribute to the complexity involved in 401(k) 
plans.  One is the number of different services and providers that the plan 
may need.110  The size of a 401(k) plan can cut both ways in terms of 
complexity.  The problem for small plans is that they need many of the 
                                                                                                                                      
109 See Davis, supra note 73, at 1028 (explaining that approximately 96% of 
all individuals actively participating in 401(k) plans have both the right and the 
responsibility to choose how to invest their account assets). 
110 See Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 344-47. 
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same services and must meet many of the same compliance requirements as 
large plans but have fewer participants and lower levels of plan assets to 
bear those costs.111 Larger plans tend to have lower per-participant fees 
because of the economies of scale those plans can achieve.112 Large plans 
may be challenged, though, to meet the diversity of interests that naturally 
occurs among a large participant population.  Finally, as employers 
examine their plan costs and compare those costs with those of other plans, 
the employers must consider the qualitative differences among the plans.  
An employer’s fiduciary obligation does not require it to offer a low-cost 
plan.  Instead, it requires the employer to act prudently and to ensure the 
plan service providers are not overcompensated for the services that they 
render.113 
A concern related to complexity and limited employer expertise is 
that employers suffer from information asymmetry on revenue sharing and 
other compensation and fees in the investment industry as compared to plan 
service providers and mutual funds.  The 2012 GAO report found that some 
plan sponsors were not aware of financial arrangements among service 
providers and investment products or, if generally aware, did not 
understand the amount or use of those fees.114 Some of the GAO’s findings 
are astonishing in the extent to which employers are unaware of or do not 
consider revenue-sharing when making plan-related decisions.  Almost half 
of the surveyed plan sponsors did not know if revenue-sharing occurred in 
their 401(k) plan.115 And a number of employers that knew revenue sharing 
occurred within their plan admitted they did not consider the revenue 
sharing compensation when selecting plan service providers.116 In some 
instances, the GAO cross-checked the fee data reported by the employers 
who participated in its study.  One example the GAO gave is that of a large 
plan that paid 16 times more in fees for administrative services and record-
keeping during one year than the employer had reported.117  Presumably, 
                                                                                                                                      
111 See GAO, supra note 27, at 15. 
112  See id. 
113 See DEP’T OF LABOR, Meeting Your Fiduciary Responsibilities 5 (2012) 
(“[F]iduciaries will want to understand the fees and expenses charged and the 
services provided”), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/meetingyour 
fiduciaryresponsibilities.pdf. 
114  See GAO, supra note 27, at 13-14, 16-21. 
115 Id. at 25. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 27. 
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the employer did not understand the extent of the fees being paid within its 
plan.  
One might assume that the disclosure obligations imposed by the 
DOL on plan service providers beginning in 2012 would eliminate this 
asymmetry.  However, experts in retirement system fees and the new 
disclosures explain that service providers are going to considerable lengths 
to make the mandated fee disclosures difficult for employers to 
comprehend and analyze.118  One commentator refers to the disclosures as 
“dizzyingly complex.”119 Discussing plan sponsor obligations in evaluating 
the disclosures, one plan consultant said “[t]he time it takes – and the 
attention to detail it takes – is more than sponsors can handle.”120 
Fewer than 60% of full time U.S. workers in the private sector 
have any access to a retirement plan.121 A well-functioning regulatory 
system would encourage employers to increase their sponsorship of 
retirement plans.  Assigning fiduciary obligation and liability for 
investment selection and monitoring to employers who voluntarily sponsor 
401(k) plans does not take advantage of a strong alignment between the 
interests of employers and employees because no such alignment exists.  
Nor does designating employers as fiduciaries utilize expertise that they 
naturally have in running their businesses because few employers naturally 
develop expertise in the complexities of investment products intended for 
individuals.  It appears that even extensive disclosure requirements may not 
entirely eliminate information asymmetries that increase the challenges 
participants face in meeting their ERISA fiduciary obligations. 
The observation that employers may not be the best-placed of the 
entire constellation of actors in the 401(k) plan system to bear the 
responsibility and liability associated with approval and monitoring of the 
                                                                                                                                      
118 See Mark Mensack, The Moral Hazard of Too Big to Jail, J. 
COMPENSATION & BENEFITS, May/June 2013, at 42, 44-45. The DOL did not 
mandate a particular format for these disclosures although it did provide a sample 
guide for preparation of the initial disclosures. See generally Reasonable Contract 
or Arrangement under Section 408(b)(2) – Fee Disclosure, 77 Fed. Reg. 5632, 
5658-59 (Feb. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).    
119 Mensack, supra note 118, at 45. 
120 Lee Barney, The Moment of Truth, PLANADVISER (Feb. 2013), available at 
http://www.planadviser.com/MagazineArticle.aspx?id=10737418889&magazine=
10737418887. 
121 Alicia Munnell et al., The Pension Coverage Problem in the Private Sector, 
CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT B.C. (Sept. 2012), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/IB_12-16.pdf.   
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use of revenue sharing is not incompatible with a regulatory system that 
appropriately protects employees.  Instead the observation provides a 
rationale for a careful examination of that constellation of actors and the 
various roles they should play in a properly performing 401(k) system.   
 
B. PROPOSALS TO REALLOCATE FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Numerous commentators and policy makers have offered proposals 
intended to improve the 401(k) system.  Some of those suggestions are 
incremental and would have little or no effect on employer responsibility 
for the use of revenue sharing.122 Other suggestions, some of which I 
categorize below based on their approach to investments and briefly 
discuss, would dramatically change the DC plan landscape.  All of the 
proposals discussed below address broad, systemic problems in the U.S. 
DC system.  However, I only discuss their implications for employer 
fiduciary responsibility for plan investments. 
In one category of proposals the federal government, or a 
committee appointed by the government, would assume total or primary 
responsibility for selection of the investments to be held in DC accounts.  
Professor Theresa Ghilarducci has offered a schematic for a system that 
would entirely replace the current DC system, which she calls Guaranteed 
Retirement Accounts (GRAs).123 The board of the Thrift Savings Plan 
(TSP), which administers and invests the DC accounts of federal 
employees, would invest GRA assets.124 Professor Ghilarducci’s plan 
would guarantee a three percent investment return in GRAs.125  During 
periods of economic stress, GRA assets and the three percent return would 
                                                                                                                                      
122 See, e.g., Colleen E. Medill, Targeted Pension Reform, 27 J. LEGIS. 1, 3 
(2001) (proposing closure of loopholes in the tax system that result in benefits 
being lower than they otherwise would be for lower wage workers); Michael W. 
Melton, Making the Nondiscrimination Rules of Tax-Qualified Retirement Plans 
More Effective, 71 B.U. L. REV. 47, 50 (1991) (arguing that tax incentives are not 
sufficient to induce low-income workers to save for retirement); see also Paul M. 
Secunda, 401(k) Follies: A Proposal to Reinvigorate the United States Annuity 
Market, 30 A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N NEWSQUARTERLY, Fall 2010, at 13, 14-15 (arguing 
for tax law changes to require 401(k) plans to offer annuitized distribution 
options). 
123 TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST 
PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM 262 (2008). 
124 Id. at 264-65. 
125 Id. at 265. 
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be protected.  On the other hand, the accounts would receive only limited 
returns during robust financial market periods.  Employers would have no 
responsibility or liability for the investments held in GRAs. 
Professor Jeff Schwartz has proposed a government-run system of 
individual accounts that, like Professor Ghilarducci’s, would replace 401(k) 
plans.126  One role of the government would be to designate a private sector 
fund manager to invest account assets, although Professor Schwartz allows 
that the system may provide some opportunity for employees to select their 
own investments.127 The default investment product to be managed by the 
government-appointed manager would consist of a portfolio made up of a 
U.S. equity index fund and treasury-inflation protected securities (TIPS).128 
While not formally promising a guaranteed minimum investment return, 
the use of TIPS is intended to provide a “guarantee[d] return of principal in 
real terms at retirement.”129 The allocation between the equity index fund 
and TIPS, and thus the effective guarantee, would vary according to 
employee age.130 As with Professor Ghilarducci’s plan, employers would 
not have any role or liability in the selection of account investments. 
  A second category of reform proposal would retain many of the 
contours of the existing 401(k) plan system but would make changes to the 
investment component of the system.  One plan receiving significant 
attention is sponsored by Senator Tom Harkin.131 If adopted, his proposal 
would require any employer not offering a DB or DC plan that meets 
minimum criteria to enroll employees into a newly-created type of private 
sector pension plan, a Universal, Secure, and Adaptable (USA) Retirement 
Fund.132 Senator Harkin’s proposal only provides the broad details of how 
USA Retirement Funds would work.  There are indications that employees 
would have individual accounts because the proposal states that “[t]he 
amount of a person’s monthly benefit would be determined based on the 
total amount of contributions made by, or on behalf of, the participant and 
                                                                                                                                      
126  Jeff Schwartz, Rethinking 401(k)s, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 53, 74-78 
(2012). 
127 See id. at 85. 
128 Id. at 83. 
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131 See generally TOM HARKIN, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., 
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investment performance over time.”133  However, the proposal also 
contemplates risk sharing, the type and amount of which is ambiguous.  
The risk sharing delegates to the trustees of each fund the flexibility to 
gradually increase or decrease benefits depending on investment 
performance.134 Such sharing of risks is incompatible with a system that 
calculates individual benefits based purely on account balances.   
The fiduciary responsibility for USA Retirement Funds would lie 
with the fund trustees charged with plan management.135 Trustees would 
represent various constituencies: employees, retirees and employers.136 
USA Retirement Funds would be licensed by an unspecified entity.137 
Employers would not have any fiduciary liability for the selection of a 
USA Retirement Fund for their employees and, in fact, would be permitted 
to “use the ‘default’ fund identified for the region, industry, or through 
collective bargaining.”138 Presumably a federal agency would determine the 
default fund for various regions and industries.  Senator Harkin’s plan does 
not seem to address the responsibility and liability for investments of 
employers that choose to offer their own DC plan rather than enrolling their 
employees in a USA retirement fund. 
Elsewhere, I have proposed a system that is similar to Senator 
Harkin’s in that it would leave intact much of the present 401(k) 
framework.139 It would decrease employer liability for investment selection 
and provide added incentives for plan sponsorship by offering additional 
liability protections for small employers.140 My proposal is centered on a 
new type of investment product, Safe Harbor Automated Retirement 
Product (SHARPs).141 In lieu of employer fiduciary obligation for 
SHARPs, I propose a two-part mechanism consisting of: (1) assigning 
fiduciary responsibility to the investment managers and fund directors that 
determine and implement a SHARP’s investment strategy; and (2) 
licensing by and reporting to a federal regulatory agency.  Disclosure 
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requirements would promote the ability to make competitive comparisons 
among SHARPs.142 
The investment strategy of SHARPs is critical to employees’ 
wealth accumulation.  SHARPs would be permitted to use any investment 
strategy that would currently meet the Qualified Default Investment 
Alternative requirements imposed by the DOL as part of a safe harbor for 
default plan investments in automatic enrollment 401(k) plans.143 To drive 
investor-focused performance and low fees, the investment managers of 
SHARPs would have fiduciary liability to act in the best interest of the 
participants, including determination, disclosure, and implementation of an 
appropriate asset allocation strategy.144 As a final check, the board 
members of a SHARP would be responsible for its compliance with 
regulatory standards and its disclosed strategy.145 
My SHARPs proposal is based, with appropriate adaptations for 
the U.S. system, on Australia’s implementation of MySuper investment 
products.  Elsewhere, I have described Australia’s approach to private 
sector pension provision in greater detail.146 Relevant here is that after the 
global financial crisis Australia undertook a review of its retirement 
system.147 The final reform recommendations were extensive.148 One 
component addressed the default investment vehicles used for the accounts 
of employees who do not designate their investment choices.  Default 
investment products are in extensive use in Australia because many 
Australians are passive with respect to their investments, do not make 
active plan choices, and have limited financial literacy.149 In the reformed 
system, MySuper products will be the only permitted type of default 
investment product.  In addition, employees who wish to make explicit 
                                                                                                                                      
142 Id. at 51.  
143 For an explanation of both QDIAs and automatic enrollment 401(k)s, see 
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146 For a discussion of the system and the values it represents, see Dana M. 
Muir, Building Value in the Australian Defined Contribution System: A Values 
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investment decisions may designate a MySuper product to receive their 
retirement plan contributions.150 
The regulatory framework is relatively simple.  The Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) will gather and make public data 
on MySuper product performance and fees to facilitate competition among 
the offerings.151 The regulatory approach to MySuper default products 
imposes an enhanced set of duties on MySuper fund entity trustees 
(sometimes referred to as corporate trustees)152 and on the boards that 
govern the entity trustees.153 Employers play no significant role and have 
no significant liability in this system.  The enhanced obligations of 
MySuper entity and individual trustees essentially will operate as an 
additional layer of duties on top of the basic set of requirements that applies 
to all entity trustees of funds that hold retirement assets.154 In addition, 
trustees must be licensed and meet specific standards with respect to the 
operation of a MySuper product.155 
Unlike the employer-based retirement system in Australia, the U.S. 
regulatory system currently relies on employers as the primary gatekeepers 
and decisionmakers for 401(k) plan investments.  This approach is a relic 
of the period when DB plans were the predominant type of retirement plan.  
In the context of the current DC system, employers’ interests do not 
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strongly align with the interests of employees who invest through those 
plans, typically do not have specialized expertise in investment products 
targeted to individual investors, and suffer from information asymmetry as 
compared to 401(k) plan service providers and entities such as mutual 
funds that invest account assets.   
A number of the proposals for reform of the U.S. 401(k) system 
advocate decreasing the responsibility and liability employers face in 
offering their employees the opportunity to use DC plans as a component 
of the employees’ pursuit of lifelong financial security.  Revenue-sharing is 
a good example of the challenges employers confront in establishing 
401(k) plan investment menus, monitoring those menus, and overseeing the 
compensation of plan service providers.  None of the proposals discussed 
here would leave plan participants unprotected.  Instead, the proposals 
divide responsibility for investment oversight in various ways among the 
federal government and the providers of investment products and 401(k) 
services. 
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
 Revenue sharing in 401(k) plans dates at least to the early 1990s.  
It took some time, though, before revenue-sharing began to receive 
significant attention from others than those who paid or received it.  The 
DOL recently has increased disclosure obligations to provide more 
transparency on the compensation, including from revenue-sharing, which 
service providers derive from 401(k) plans. 
 In addition to the disclosure obligations, ERISA imposes fiduciary 
obligations and liability on employers for the selection and monitoring of 
401(k) plan investments and service providers.  Cases brought by 
participants alleging excessive investment fees and service provider 
compensation have highlighted these obligations, including the role played 
by revenue sharing.  But workers struggling to meet their survival needs 
and save for the future deserve a better system.  The current fiduciary 
structure serves to discourage employers, particularly small employers, 
who have neither the expertise nor the time to understand financial 
products targeted at individual investors and the compensation practices, 
including revenue-sharing, used in the financial sector, from establishing a 
401(k) plan.  In today’s competitive business environment, even large 
employers may be reluctant to develop the expertise necessary to meet 
ERISA’s substantive fiduciary standards.  In short, revenue-sharing is but 
one example, albeit an important one, of why the US needs to carefully 
evaluate its approach to building retirement wealth for its workers. 
